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INDIVIDUAL ACTIONS FOR BREACH OF A
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT:
JUDICIAL ALTERNATIVES TO THE
GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE
[Tihe labor movement in the United States is passing into a new phase.
The struggle of the unions for recognition and rights to bargain, and of
workmen for the right to join without interference, seems to be culminat-
ing in a victory for labor forces. We appear now to be entering the phase
of struggle to reconcile the rights of individuals and minorities with the
power of those who control collective bargaining groups.'
I. INTRODUCTION
In exchange for the benefits that collective bargaining has secured for
the individual employee,2 he has relinquished important rights that an-
tedate contemporary labor-management relations law.' The worker
has exchanged his interests in direct dealings with the employer for the
privilege of representation by the collective bargaining agent.4 Union
vitality relies on this subordination of the individual for the benefit of
the group.' Unfortunately, this yielding of individual employee con-
cerns sometimes may result in their total suppression. When an em-
ployee is wrongfully discharged or deprived of other rights granted by
a collective bargaining agreement, he is often left remediless because
the structure of collective bargaining and union participation therein
may constrict his access to the courts.6
This Note examines the parameters of an employee's right to sue his
employer for breach of the collective bargaining agreement without, or
in spite of, union involvement. It suggests expanded judicial review of
the union-maintained grievance process to minimize circumscription of
individual rights.
. Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 248, 271 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
2. See notes 7-9 infra and accompanying text.
3. See notes 14-15 infra and accompanying text.
4 See notes 12-13 infra and accompanying text.
5. See notes 14-15 infra and accompanying text.
6 See notes 58-72 infra and accompanying text.
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II. THE UNION, THE INDIVIDUAL, AND THE Loss OF SYMBIOSIS
As a collective bargaining unit, the union seeks to provide a rough
equivalence of economic and organizational power between labor and
management.7 The strength inherent in a cohesive labor group furthers
its efforts to secure a greater distribution of the economic benefits pro-
duced by American labor.8 Additionally, by providing an institutional
framework for employer-employee relations, unions promote the stabi-
lization of industrial relations.9
When workers band together to form a collective bargaining unit'0
or when an employee joins an existing unit, individual concerns must
yield to the rule of the majority. 1 Section 9(a) of the National Labor
Relations Act provides that the bargaining unit shall select a represen-
tative to undertake the negotiation and administration of the employ-
ment agreement on behalf of all employees within the unit.12 The
7. "The economic power that the worker faced in the sale of his labor-the competition of
'many sellers dealing with few buyers--made it necessary that he organize for his own protection.
There were rewards ... which, when he had successfully developed countervailing power, he
could share." J. GALBRAITH, AMERICAN CAPITALISM: THE CONCEPT OF COUNTERVAILING
POWER 115 (1956). See generally R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW 296 (1976); Cox, The
Duty to Bargain in Good Faith, 71 HARV. L. REv. 1401, 1407 (1958); Dunau, Employee PardIcipa.
tion in the Grievance.Aspect of Collective Bargaining, 50 COLUM. L. REv. 731, 735 (1950); Welling-
ton, The Constitution, The Labor Union, and "GovernmentalAction," 70 YALE L.J. 345, 364 (1961).
8. The Supreme Court has voiced similar sentiments:
National labor policy has been built on the premise that by pooling their economic
strength and acting through a labor organization freely chosen by the majority, the em-
ployees of an appropriate unit have the most effective means of bargaining for improve-
ments in wages, hours, and working conditions.
NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 180 (1967).
9. See United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960).
10. Section 7 of the National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976), sets
forth the basic organizational rights:
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor orga-
nizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to
engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other
mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such
activities ....
11. See generally Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 678 (1944); Order of R.R.
Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, 321 U.S. 342 (1944); J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S.
332 (1944).
12. National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976):
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the
majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive
representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining
in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employ-
ment: Provided, That any individual employee or a group of employees shall have the
right at any time to present grievances to their employer and to have such grievances
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representative's capacity as the sole bargaining agent for the members
of the unit is commonly termed the principle of exclusivity. 13 When
the bargaining agent undertakes employment contract negotiations, the
nature of the employment agreement changes from a private instru-
ment between the employee and employer to a charter setting forth the
basic rules for management dealings with all employees.' 4 The em-
ployees' former right to contract individually with the employer thus
becomes merged and vested exclusively in the bargaining agent. 5
Although granting the union such considerable power gives rise to
corresponding opportunities for capricious action, 6 its role as the sole
adjusted, without the intervention of the bargaining representative, as long as the adjust-
ment is not inconsistent with the terms of a collective-bargaining contract or agreement
then in effect: Providedfurther, That the bargaining representative has been given oppor-
tunity to be present at such adjustment.
A cursory examination of the first proviso to § 9(a) suggests that an individual may adjust his
grievance without the aid of his union as long as such adjustment is not inconsistent with the
collective bargaining agreement. However, "the proviso to section 9(a) merely gives the employer
a defense to a charge of refusal to bargain with the majority union. . . when it adjusts a grievance
with an individual employee or group of employees; it does not impose an affirmative duty to do
so." R. GORMAN, supra note 7, at 392. See generally Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition
Community Org., 420 U.S. 50 (1975).
13. For an excellent discussion of the exclusivity doctrine, see R. GORMAN, supra note 7, at
374-81; Dunau, supra note 7, at 734-35. The doctrine has been the subject of heated criticism. See
Petro, Civil Liberty, Syndicalism, and the NLRA, 5 U. TOL. L. REV. 447, 498-523 (1974). "[With
the best will in the world unions cannot help being unfair to individual employees, for there is no
way to reconcile the 'exclusive-bargaining majority-rule' principle with the principles of personal
freedom and personal autonomy." Id. at 465. Professor Petro goes on to call the NLRA a
.'collectivist-fascist-syndicalist' measure, profoundly anti-libertarian and dehumanizing in its
operation." Id. at 466. For a more restrained view of possible individual rights infringement
through use of the exclusivity doctrine, see Cox, Rights Under a Labor Agreement, 69 HARv. L.
REV. 601, 630-34 (1956).
14. "The very purpose of providing by statute for the collective agreement is to supersede the
terms of separate agreements of employees with terms which reflect the strength and bargaining
power and serve the welfare of the group." J.I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332, 338 (1944). See
United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564,570 (1960). See generally Cox, The Duty
of Fair Representation, 2 VILL. L. Rnv. 151, 152 (1957); Dunau, supra note 7, at 732; Givens,
Federal Protection of Employee Rights Within Trade Unions, 29 FoRDHAM L. REV. 259, 273
(1960); Shulman, Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HARv. L. REV. 999, 1002-04
(1955); Summers, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration orAlice Through the Looking Glass, 2 BuF-
FALO L. REV. 1, 24 (1952).
15. See Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 571 (1976). "The union's broad
authority in negotiating and administering effective agreements is 'undoubted.' " -d. at 564 (cit-
ing Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 342 (1964)). See generally Weyand, The Scope of Collective
Bargaining Under the Taft-Hartley Act, in PROCEEDINGS OF NEw YORK UNIVERSITY FIRST AN-
NUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR LAW 257 (1948).
16. See Blumrosen, Group Interests in Labor Law, 13 RuTGERS L. REV. 432, 454 (1959).
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focus for all employer-employee interchange is central to its ability to
engage in concerted action. 17 The assumption that the union's interests
and those of its rank and file are roughly coexistent underlies the vesti-
ture of such extensive power in the unions.18 When this assumption is
valid, the union's power of exclusivity does not impinge upon the con-
cerns of the individual employee.
As workers recognized the benefits of collective bargaining, 19 unions
grew into massive organizations. 20 Along with this expansive develop-
ment, unions began to take on institutional concerns that often were
not directed to the structuring of employer-employee relations at the
shop level.21 National unions conceive and coordinate broad adminis-
trative policies for their subordinate locals. 22 In the interest of promot-
ing their policy concerns or some particular political cause, the
nationals often bargain directly with large employers, thus preempting
their local units.' Additionally, national union constitutions may
17. "The principle of exclusive union representation, which underlies the National Labor
Relations Act as well as the Railway Labor Act, is a central element in the congressional structur-
ing of industrial relations." Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 220 (1977). See
generally Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 420 U.S. 50, 62-63
(1975); Virginia Ry. v. System Fed'n No. 40, 300 U.S. 515, 545-49 (1937).
18. See Note, The Duty afFair Representation and Exclusive Representation in Grievance Ad-
ministration The Duty fFair Representation, 27 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1199, 1211 (1976).
19. Unions have checked the arbitrary will of the employer, and substituted a rough rule
of law governing employment activities; they have improved the economic position of
the employees they represent both in direct wage increases and in an impressive array of
fringe benefits and devices to protect the jobs of the workers.
Blumrosen, he Worker and Three Phases of UnionisTS" Administrative and Judicial Control af the
Worker-Union Relationship, 61 MICH. L. REV. 1435, 1464 (1963).
20. See B. MELTZER, LABOR LAW, CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS 1-16 (2d ed. 1977).
According to figures from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, roughly one-quarter of all nonagricul-
tural employees in the United States are union members. U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS,
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS (1976), reprinted in 96 LAB. REL. REP.
(BNA) 34 (1977).
21. In recent years unions have moved with increasing confidence between the bargain-
ing table and the legislative halls. Their lobbying activities on almost all legislative mat-
ters are well known. When legislation concerning the permissible scope of union
economic power comes before Congress, unions mass their political strength to preserve
and expand their freedom to use economic pressure in collective bargaining. The inter-
relationship between union economic activity and union political action is obvious and
intense.
Blumrosen, supra note 19, at 1438. See generally Developments in the La--Judicial Control of
Actions of Private Associations, 76 HARV. L. REV. 983, 989 (1963); Note, supra note 18, at 1208.
22. See Cohn & Lubell, Control of a Labor Union-By Whom, Over What?, 22 OHIO ST. L.J.
163, 163-64 (1961); Note, supra note 18, at 1210-11.
23. Mayer, .4 House Divided-The Schism Doctrine, 22 OHIO ST. L.J. 154, 154 (1961) ("Se-
renity and harmony are hardly the hallmark of parent-local union relationship."). Cf., e.g.,
[Vol. 1978:765
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favor one group of employees over another.24
At the local level, similar institutional concerns may fail to corre-
spond to the desires of the rank and file. The interests of some particu-
lar minority faction within the local or an individual grievance may be
sacrificed by the union in the interest of maintaining an amicable rela-
tionship with management.25  The individual employee, however,
stands at the foundation of this structure and, after having been denied
i promotion or terminated wrongfully, must usually look exclusively to
the union-administered grievance procedure for satisfaction.26
The development of institutional union goals distinct from rank and
file goals has frequently led to grievance disposition on terms compati-
ble with the union's internal needs irrespective of the complaint's un-
derlying merits.27 If the union fails to bring an employee's grievance to
Gordon v. Laborers' Int'l, 490 F.2d 133, 138-39 (1974) (international sought to invalidate local's
collective bargaining agreement through imposition of trusteeship); Local 90, Am. Flint Glass
Workers v. American Flint Glass Workers, 374 F. Supp. 600, 601 (D. Md. 1974) (local's wage
scale agreement superseded by nationwide agreement); BOOK OF LAWS OF THE INTERNATIONAL
TYPOGRAPHICAL UNION art. 7, § 3 (1974) (international must give prior approval of contract
terms); id. § 33 (proposed arbitration of grievances must be cleared through the international prior
to processing).
24. Article 19, § 3 of the CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED AUTOMOBILE, AEROSPACE, & AG-
RICULTURAL IMPLEMENT WORKERS OF AMERICA (1974) provides:
Upon application to and approval of the International Executive Board, a ratification
procedure may be adopted wherein apprenticable skilled trades and related workers,
production workers, office workers, engineers, and technicians would vote separately on
contractual matters common to all and, in the same vote, on those matters which relate
exclusively to their group.
Under such a provision, a measure that has received majority approval by the aggregate local
membership would still not pass if certain skilled workers, voting as a subgroup, did not also grant
the measure majority approval. See Gardner v. Woodcock, 384 F. Supp. 239 (E.D. Mich. 1974).
25. See Tobias, 4 Pleafor the Wrongfully DischargedEmployee Abandonedby His Union, 41
U. CIN. L. REv. 55, 60 (1972). See generally Blumrosen, supra note 19, at 1465; Blumrosen, Legal
Protection for Critical Job Interests: Union-Management Authority Versus Employee Autonomy, 13
RUTGERS L. REv. 631, 651-53 (1959).
For purposes of this Note, a grievance is defined as an assertion of a claim arising under the
collective bargaining agreement. See Gray, The Individual Worker and the Right to Arbitrate, 12
LAB. L.J. 816, 817 (1961).
26. See Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 420 U.S. 50, 70
(1975) (minority group employees may not bypass union grievance procedures and bargain di-
rectly with employer); Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 678, 687 (1944) (employees
may not consent to an employer ignoring their designated bargaining agent and dealing with them
directly). See generally R. GORMAN, supra note 7, at 374-94; THE LABOR LAW GROUP TRUST,
LABOR RELATIONS AND SOCIAL PROBLEMS 115 (1971); Ratner, Some Contemporary Observations
on Section 301, 52 GEO. L.J. 260, 265 (1963); notes 12-13 supra; text accompanying note 58 infra.
27. See, ag., Encina v. Tony Lama Boot Co., 448 F.2d 1264, 1265 (5th Cir. 1971) (union's
fiscal policies restricted pursuit of grievance); Richardson v. Communications Workers, 443 F.2d
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arbitration, it can usually justify the inaction by relying on its broad
discretion to pursue a particular employee's rights.2" The exclusivity
doctrine and the attendant administrative discretion of the union lead-
ership provide the union with a subtle means of favoring one individ-
ual over another or of sanctioning the recalcitrant member.29 A
paradox is thus presented: When the union becomes a new source of
employee frustration, it contradicts its raison d' etre as a champion of
employee rights.30 Exasperated, the employee may sometimes seek the
aid of the courts.31
III. THE DOCTRINE OF EXHAUSTION OF CONTRACTUAL REMEDIES
AS A LIMITATION ON INDIVIDUAL EMPLOYEE SUITS
If an individual asserts that he has been wrongfully discharged or
974 (8th Cir. 1971) (union refusal to process employee's grievance on the ground that he was a
"troublemaker"), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 818 (1972); Local 12, United Rubber Workers v. NLRB,
368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966) (union refusal to process back wage grievances for a period during
which petitioners were unemployed due to a racially discriminatory seniority system). On the
impact of union inaction or ineptitude, see text accompanying notes 59-61 infra.
28. In Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330 (1953), the Supreme Court recognized: "A
wide range of reasonableness must be allowed a statutory bargaining representative in serving the
unit it represents." Id. at 338.
29. Grievance handling offers the union opportunities for subtle discriminations which
do not exist in the negotiation of general rules for the future. Loyal unionists may have
their grievances pressed promptly to a successful conclusion while workers who have not
joined the union or who opposed the business agent in the last union election find it
harder to obtain favorable adjustments. The temptation to engage in "horse trading" is
not inconsiderable.
Cox, supra note 13, at 630. See Schatzki, Majority Rule, Exclusive Representation, and the Interests
of Individual Workers: ShouldExclusivity Be Abolished?, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 897, 911 (1975).
30. See THE LABOR LAW GROUP TRUST, supra note 26, at 103; Marchione, 4 Casefor Indi-
vidual Rights Under Collective Agreements, 27 LAB. L.J. 738, 739 (1976); Symposium-Individual
Rights in Industrial SeyffGovernment-A "State Action"Analysis, 63 Nw. U.L. REv. 4, 4 (1968).
31. If the employee can establish that the union breached its duty of fair representation to-
ward him, see text accompanying notes 109-49 infra, he may obtain some measure of relief from
the National Labor Relations Board. There have been a limited number of cases holding that a
breach of this duty is an unfair labor practice. See, e.g., NLRB v. Local 1367, Longshoremens'
Ass'n, 368 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 837 (1967); Local 12, United Rubber
Workers v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 12 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 837 (1967); NLRB v. Mi-
randa Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), enforcement denied, 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963). The
remedial power of the Board, however, is generally limited to compensating the employee for
damage caused by the union's failure to adequately represent him. Accordingly, the Board is
usually unable to provide relief for the employee vis i vis his employer. See generally Note,
Unreviewability of General Counsel's Discretio m ProposedAmendments for a Private Cause ofAc.
tionfor Unfair Labor Practices, 82 DIcK. L. REv. 409 (1978); Comment, Unfair Representation and
the NationalLabor Relations Board'A Functional.Analysis, 37 J. AIR L. & COM. 89 (1971).
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that his employer has breached the collective bargaining agreement,32
he may file suit in federal or state court under section 301(a) of the
Labor-Management Relations Act.33 Originally, courts did not con-
strue section 301(a) as giving rise to a cause of action for an employee
suing in an individual capacity. For example, in Association of Salaried
Employees v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.,, the Supreme Court held
that federal courts could not hear individual claims brought under sec-
tion 301(a).35 The Court reasoned that because the action was in the
nature of a breach of contract, it was within the sole province of state
courts, and federal courts lacked jurisdiction.3 6 Soon afterward, in Tex-
tile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills,37 the Court said it would assume
32. See, e.g., cases cited in note 142 infra.
33. Labor-Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, § 301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1976).
Section 301(a) provides:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organization repre-
senting employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter, or be-
tween any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United
States having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or
without regard to the citizenship of the parties.
Initially, actions for breach of the collective bargaining agreement could not be brought in state
courts. Cf. Moore v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 312 U.S. 630 (1941) (employee could not maintain an
action under the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1970), in state court). In 1962, how-
ever, the Supreme Court indicated that since Congress intended to leave enforcement of collective
bargaining agreements "to the usual process of the law," state courts retain concurrent jurisdiction
over such claims. Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtaey, 368 U.S. 502, 513 (1962). See also An-
drews v. Louisville & N. Ry., 406 U.S. 320, 324 (1972); Amalgamated Ass'n of Street, Elec. Ry., &
Motor Coach Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 278 (1971); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 180
(1967); Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195, 197 (1962); Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas
Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 101 (1962). For a discussion of state court actions, see Note, The Duty of
Fair Representation in the Administration of Grievance Procedures Under Collective Bargaining
Agreements, 1968 WASH. U.L.Q. 437, 445-57.
Similar concerns arose about whether violations of the collective agreement that were also un-
fair labor practices fell within the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board. In
Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962), the Court confronted this problem and held:
'The authority of the Board to deal with an unfair labor practice which also violates a collective
bargaining contract is not displaced by § 301, but it is not exclusive and does not destroy the
jurisdiction of the courts in suits under § 301." Id. at 197.
34. 348 U.S. 437 (1955).
35. Id. at 451-53. For discussion of this strict contractual view of collective bargaining agree-
ments, see Feller, A General Theory of the Collective BargainingAgreement, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 663,
774 (1973); Hoeniger, The IndividualEmployment Contract Under the WagnerAct:-I, 10 FoRDHAm
L. REv. 14, 15 (1941); Comment, The Individual Worker's Right To Sue in His Own Name in a
Collective Bargaining Situation, 17 S.D.L. REv. 217, 218 (1972).
36. 348 U.S. at 451.
37. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
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jurisdiction over claims, but only in cases where the union brings suit.38
The Court finessed its earlier pronouncement in Westinghouse by hold-
ing that Congress intended section 301(a) to provide federal substantive
remedies for breaches of collective bargaining agreements, thus serving
to preempt state contract law.39 In state actions for breach of a collec-
tive bargaining agreement, the federal substantive law of section 301 (a)
would still apply.4
In 1962 the Supreme Court relaxed the barrier to individual actions
in Smith v. Evening News Association,4' ruling that an employee as well
as a union could enforce a collective bargaining agreement.42 The
Court said that the denial of a judicial hearing on such actions would
have a disruptive influence on the effective enforcement of collective
bargaining agreements.43 The Smith decision, however, resurrected the
barrier of Humphrey v. Moore,44 holding personal claims of an em-
ployee justiciable only if he further alleges dishonest union representa-
tion.45 Finally, in Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox,46 the Court
indicated that if a collective bargaining agreement provides for a griev-
ance procedure, the employee must exhaust this mechanism as a pre-
condition to judicial access.47 The Court asserted that allowing an
employee to sidestep the grievance procedure "would deprive employer
and union of the ability to establish a uniform and exclusive method
38. Id. at 459 n.9.
39. Id. at 450-51.
40. Id. at 457. See also San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 246
(1959).
41. 371 U.S. 195 (1962).
42. Id. at 200. See 35 FORDHAM L. REV. 517 (1967).
43. Individual claims lie at the heart of the grievance and arbitration machinery, are to a
large degree inevitably intertwined with union interests, and many times precipitate
grave questions concerning the interpretation and enforceability of the collective bar-
gaining contract on which they are based. To exclude these claims from the ambit of
§ 301 would stultify the congressional policy of having the administration of collective
bargaining contracts accomplished under a uniform body of federal substantive law.
This we are unwilling to do.
371 U.S. at 200.
44. 375 U.S. 335 (1964).
45. Id. at 349.
46. 379 U.S. 650 (1965).
47. "As a general rule. federal labor policy requires that individual employees wishing
to assert contract grievances must attempt use of the contract grievance procedure agreed upon by
employer and union as the mode of redress." Id. at 652 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in original).
Prior to Maddox, the Court had given its approval to the exhaustion doctrine where required by
state law. See Transcontinental & W. Air, Inc. v. Koppal, 345 U.S. 653, 662 (1953). See also
Moore v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 312 U.S. 630 (1941).
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for orderly settlement of employee grievances. 48 Subsequent decisions
have consistently adopted the reasoning of Maddox, forcing the worker
to place primary reliance on the contractual procedures of dispute
resolution.49
In justifying this limitation of employee suits, courts frequently assert
48. 379 U.S. at 653.
49. See, e.g., Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 562 (1976); Lomax v. Arm-
strong Cork Co., 433 F.2d 1277, 1280 (5th Cir. 1970). But see Adams v. Rear, 424 F. Supp. 1115,
1117 (W.D. Okla. 1976). See generally Flynn & Higgins, Fair Representation: .4 Survey of the
Contemporar' Framework and a Proposed Change in the Duty Owed to the Employee, 8 SUFFOLK
L. REV. 1096, 1140 (1974); Simpson & Berwick, Exhaustion of Grievance Procedures and the Indi-
vidual Employee, 51 TEx. L. REV. 1179, 1195 (1973).
There is substantial disagreement about what constitutes exhaustion. Some courts find exhaus-
tion requirements fulfilled when the union will proceed no further. See Law v. Joint Checkers
Union, 412 F.2d 795 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 596 (1969); Tribbet v. Chicago Union Station
Co., 352 F. Supp. 8 (N.D. Ill. 1972); Fulson v. United-Buckingham Freight Lines, Inc., 324 F.
Supp. 135 (W.D. Mo. 1970). Other jurisdictions have held that even though the employee has
pursued a procedure as far as he can, there is no exhaustion because the union has yet to pursue
all steps at its disposal. See Ford v. General Elec. Co., 395 F.2d 157 (7th Cir. 1968); Cady v. Twin
Rivers Towing Co., 339 F. Supp. 885 (W.D. Pa. 1972); Sedlarik v. General Motors Corp., 54
F.R.D. 230 (W.D. Mich. 1971).
The only lesson to be drawn from this chaos is that the courts are woefully imprecise
in their use of exhaustion terminology. Examining what courts do, not what they say,
indicates that they are simply deciding whether plaintiffs seeking judicial redress have
offered sufficient justification for not continuing with private procedures.
Simpson & Berwick, supra, at 1198.
For discussions of the common law basis of this requirement in other organizational contexts,
see Chafee, The Internal Affairs ofAssociations Notfor Profit, 43 HARV. L. REV. 993 (1930); Sum-
mers, Legal Limitations on Union Discipline, 64 HARV. L. REv. 1049, 1086-92 (1951); Note, Ex-
haustion ofRemedies in Private Voluntary Associations, 65 YALE L.J. 369 (1956).
Under the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin) Act, §§ 1-611, 29
U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1976), a similar exhaustion requirement does not limit employee suits. Some
cases seem to allow the judge discretion in determining if exhaustion of internal remedies is neces-
sary. See, e.g., NLRB v. Industrial Union of Marine Workers, 391 U.S. 418, 426 (1967) (dictum);
Vervile v. International Ass'n of Mach. & Aerospace Workers, 520 F.2d 615, 620 (6th Cir. 1975);
Simmons v. Avisco, 350 F.2d 1012, 1016-17 (4th Cir. 1965). See generally Blumrosen, supra note
19, at 1460; Summers, The Individual Employee's Rights Under the Collective Agreement: What
Constitutes Fair Representation, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 251 (1977).
The specific standing provision under the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure (Lan-
drum-Griffin) Act is found at § 102, 29 U.S.C. § 412 (1976):
Any person whose rights secured by the provisions of [Title 1] have been infringed by
any violation of this title may bring a civil action in a district court of the United States
for such relief (including injunctions) as may be appropriate. Any such action against a
labor organization shall be brought in the district court of the United States for the
district where the alleged violation occurred, or where the principal office of such labor
organization is located.
Courts, however, have not used the Landrum-Griffin Act to enforce collective bargaining agree-
ments, and accordingly, it will probably be of little use to individuals. See generally Kratzke,
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that Congress designated the arbitration and grievance mechanisms as
the most desirable means of conflict resolution. 0 As the Court said in
Maddox, this congressional mandate would be subverted if employees
were allowed immediate access to the courts.5'
Courts further explain the exhaustion doctrine by reasoning that the
parties have "agreed" to resort to internal procedures. 2 When labor
and management include a grievance mechanism in their collective
bargaining agreement,53 the union and employer have assumed that it
will be the exclusive means of conflict resolution.54 Use of the griev-
ance procedure allows courts to defer to the unique expertise of arbitra-
tors experienced in labor matters.55 Staying the hand of judicial review
encourages employers and employees to place their house in order5 6
without taxing judicial resources.57
Fiduciary Obligations in the Internal Political Affairs of Labor Unions Under Section 501(a) of the
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 18 B.C. INDUS. & CoM. L. REv. 1019 (1977).
50. Section 203 of the Labor-Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, 29 U.S.C. § 173(d)
(1976), provides:
Final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the parties is declared to be the desir-
able method for settlement of grievance disputes arising over the application or interpre-
tation of an existing collective-bargaining agreement. The Service is directed to make its
conciliation and mediation services available in the settlement of such grievance disputes
only as a last resort and in exceptional cases.
See, e.g., Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers, 428 U.S. 397, 407 (1976); Gateway Coal Co. v.
UMW, 414 U.S. 368, 377 (1974); UMW v. Barnes & Tucker Co., 561 F.2d 1093, 1096 (3d Cir.
1977).
51. 379 U.S. at 652-53.
52. See Orphan v. Furnco Constr. Corp., 466 F.2d 795, 800-01 (7th Cir. 1972). See also Neal
v. System Bd. of Adjustment, 348 F.2d 722, 726 (8th Cir. 1965).
53. See Simpson & Berwick, supra note 49, at 1199.
Some unions include an exhaustion requirement in their constitutions. Article 32 of the CON-
STITUTION OF THE UNITED AUTOMOBILE, AEROSPACE, & AGRICULTURAL IMPLEMENT WORKERS
OF AMERICA sets forth such a requirement in § 13, providing: "It shall be the duty of any member
... who feels aggrieved by any action, decision, or penalty imposed upon him .... to exhaust
his... remedy and all appeals therefrom under the laws of this International Union prior to
appealing to a civil court or governmental agency for redress." See Newgent v. Modine Mfg. Co.,
495 F.2d 919, 927 (7th Cir. 1974).
54. See Blumrosen, supra note 19, at 1457. For further elaboration of a worker's "choice" of
the stated grievance procedure, see notes 186-88 infra and accompanying text.
55. See Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp., 523 F.2d 306, 312 (6th Cir. 1975); Ruggirello v.
Ford Motor Co., 411 F. Supp. 758, 762 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
56. See Local 657, United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners v. Sidell, 552 F.2d 1250, 1254 (7th
Cir. 1977); Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp., 523 F.2d 306,311 (6th Cir. 1975); Imel v. Zohn Mfg.
Co., 481 F.2d 181, 183 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 915 (1974). See generally Summers,
The Law of Union D&sclline: What Courts Do In Fact, 70 YALE L.J. 175, 207 (1960).
57. See Tobias, Individual Employee Suitsfor Breach ofthe Labor Agreement and the Union'r
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The employee usually does not have a right to personally process a
grievance or to invoke arbitration without union assistance.5 8 The con-
tractual grievance procedure's effectiveness thus becomes a function of
how well the union represents an employee.5 9 Unfortunately, the
union may not always give a particular grievance the requisite atten-
tion, which may result in an unfavorable disposition of a claim for rea-
sons unrelated to its validity.' In most cases, the employee will be
Dut
, 
ofFair Representation, 5 U. TOL. L. REv. 514, 531 (1974). See generally Buzzard v. Interna-
tional Ass'n of Mach. & Aerospace Workers, 480 F.2d 35, 42 (9th Cir. 1973).
58. See Black-Clawson Co. v. International Ass'n of Machinists Lodge 55, 313 F.2d 179 (2d
Cir. 1962); Procter & Gamble Independent Union v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 312 F.2d 181
(2d Cir. 1962); Woody v. Sterling Alum. Prods., Inc., 243 F. Supp. 755 (E.D. Mo. 1965), aI'd, 365
F.2d 448 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 957 (1967); Ostrofsky v. United Steelworkers, 171
F. Supp. 782 (D. Md. 1959), afft'dper curian, 273 F.2d 614 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 849
(1960). See generally Tobias, supra note 57, at 529.
Even if the contract allows an employee to process the grievance, Tobias suggests:
[A]ny right to proceed alone, without union help, is meaningless. Grievances do not
often succeed without the full support of the union. Normally employees do not have
the knowledge, experience, or ability to process and present their own cases. Frequently,
employees do not possess copies of the labor agreement. In any event, the individual
dischargee is rarely able to interpret correctly the applicable substantive and procedural
provisions.
Tobias, supra note 25, at 568.
On its face, § 9(a) of the National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, 29 U.S.C. §159(a) (1976),
seems to confer a limited right to pursue an action against one's employee. Section 9(a) reads in
pertinent part:
Provided, That any individual employee or a group of employees shall have the right at
any time to present grievances to their employer and to have such grievances adjusted,
without the intervention of the bargaining representative, as long as the adjustment is not
inconsistent with the terms of a collective-bargaining contract or agreement then in ef-
fect: Providedfurther, That the bargaining representative has been given opportunity to
be present at such adjustment.
Preferring to place greater credence in the latter proviso, courts still interpret most collective bar-
gaining agreements as granting the union exclusive power to process grievances. See Malone v.
United States Postal Serv., 526 F.2d 1099, 1106-07 (6th Cir. 1975); Harris v. Chemical Leaman
Tank Lines, Inc., 437 F.2d 167, 170 (5th Cir. 1971); Black-Clawson Co. v. International Ass'n of
Machinists Lodge 355, 313 F.2d 179, 185-86 (2d Cir. 1962). But see NLRB v. Tanner Motor
Livery, Ltd., 419 F.2d 216, 218 (9th Cir. 1969); note 12 supra. See also Summers, supra note 49, at
251.
59. See Harrison v. Chrysler Corp., 558 F.2d 1273, 1276 (7th Cir. 1977). At least one court
has implicitly recognized this fact by compelling a union, in the face of its unfair representation, to
bear the expense of a member's independent legal representation secured to process his grievance.
NLRB v. Teamsters Local 396, 509 F.2d 1075, 1079 n.3 (9th Cir.), cer. denied, 421 U.S. 976
(1975).
60. "mhe union in processing grievances may have an interest in the compromise or settle-
ment of a complaint without regard to its particular merits. ... Wellington, Union Democracy
and Fair Representation: Federal Responsibilt.y in a Federal System, 67 YALE L.J. 1327, 1336
(1958); see Tobias, supra note 57, at 527.
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bound by this unfavorable disposition unless he can demonstrate that
the union acted in bad faith.61
If an employee is fortunate enough to have his claim reach the arbi-
tration stage,62 the structure of the arbitration system may pose another
obstacle.63 Employers and unions usually hire and pay for the services
of the arbitrators.' Their tenure lasts only as long as they continue to
satisfy the interests of management and the union.65 Accordingly, the
arbitrator will find himself hard-pressed to pursue vigorously the cause
of an employee if it does not coincide with the interests of either the
union, the employer, or both.66 Consistent with the judicial preference
for arbitration, if the arbitrator returns a ruling unfavorable to the em-
ployee, courts will typically refuse review and consider it a final adjudi-
cation of the employee's claim regardless of its merits. 67
This deference to the arbitrator's decision, known as the doctrine of
finality, is part of the continuing judicial preference for the contractual
dispute settlement process. 68  If the agreement calls for a mechanism
other than arbitration as the terminal step in the grievance procedure, it
61. See notes 138-42 infra and accompanying text.
62. Lewis v. Greyhound Lines-East, 555 F.2d 1053, 1055 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (union has discre-
tion to pursue only meritorious grievances); Acuffv. United Papermakers, 404 F.2d 169, 171 (5th
Cir.) (union has discretion to process member's grievance to arbitration stage), cert. denied, 394
U.S. 987 (1968). See generally Tobias, supra note 57, at 527.
63. For discussion of the difficulty in attacking arbitration awards generally, see Markham,
Judicial Review ofan Arbitrator's Award Under § 301(aJ ofthe Labor-Management Relations Act,
39 TENN. L. REV. 613, 631-45 (1972); Summers, Individual Rights in Collective Agreements and
Arbitration, 37 N.Y.U. L. REv. 362, 396-410 (1962); Note, A Survey ofLabor Remedies, 54 VA. L.
REv. 38, 112-13 (1968).
64. See Shulman, supra note 14, at 1016.
65. See Simpson & Berwick, supra note 49, at 1168-69; Note, The NLRB and De/erence to
Arbitration, 77 YALE L.J. 1191, 1195 (1968).
66. See Note, supra note 65, at 1195.
67. Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 571 (1976); Provenzino v. Merchants'
Forwarding, 363 F. Supp. 168, 174 (E.D. Mich. 1973). See also Boys Mkts., Inc. v. Retail Clerks
Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1973).
The most authoritative statements requiring judicial deferral to arbitration are contained in
three labor cases referred to collectively as the Steelworkers Trilogy. See United Steelworkers v.
Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navi-
gation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
See generally Simpson & Berwick, supra note 49, at 1187. There are, however, exceptions to this
deferral. If an employee can show a breach of the duty of fair representation, an arbitrator's
award will be subject to judicial review. See notes 123-30 infra and accompanying text. See also
Levy, The Collective Bargaining Agreement as a Limitation on Union Control of Employee
Grievances, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 1036, 1048 (1970).
68. See, eg., Piper v. Meco, Inc., 412 F.2d 752, 752 (6th Cir. 1969) (per curiam); Boone v.
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will be treated as a similarly binding disposition of employee claims. 6 9
Generally, if an employee brings an action against his employer or
seeks to have a settlement judicially reviewed, the employer merely sets
up the final award as a defense and is accorded a summary judgment in
his favor.70
Although courts are clearly not capable of being the primary source
of employee-management dispute resolution,7" complete abdication
yields harsh results. A strict application of the exhaustion doctrine may
place an employee abandoned by his union in an onerous position. If
an employee sues an employer without resorting to the contractual
grievance procedure, the exhaustion doctrine will operate as an effec-
tive defense. And if submission to the procedure yields an unfavorable
resolution, the employee similarly will be left remediless.
72
IV. EXCEPTIONS TO THE EXHAUSTION RULE
As with any "absolute" rule, there are statutory and judicial excep-
tions to the exhaustion doctrine. If an aggrieved employee can fashion
Armstrong Cork Co., 384 F.2d 285, 289, 291 (5th Cir. 1967); Hill v. Aro Corp., 275 F. Supp. 482,
488 (N.D. Ohio 1967).
69. It is not arbitration per se that federal policy favors, but rather final adjustment of
differences by means selected by the parties. If the parties agree that a procedure other
than arbitration shall provide a conclusive resolution of their differences, federal labor
policy encourages that procedure no less than arbitration.
UMW v. Barnes & Tucker Co., 561 F.2d 1093, 1096 (3d Cir. 1977); see General Drivers Local 89
v. Riss & Co., 372 U.S. 517, 519 (1963) (per curiam) (if the collective bargaining agreement made
the decision of a joint committee "final and binding" it would be judicially enforceable like an
arbitration award). See generally Simpson & Berwick, supra note 49, at 1196.
70. See Tobias, supra note 25, at 67. But e. Longshoremen's Local 13 v. Pacific Maritime
Ass'n, 441 F.2d 1061, 1067-69 (9th Cir.) (matter of "good faith" in aca-type cases, see text ac-
companying notes 123-30 infra, is a question of fact that should not be decided on summary
judgment), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1016 (1971). Strict application of the contractual rationale for
binding arbitration has resulted in an interesting corollary in at least one jurisdiction. In United
Steelworkers v. Mesker Bros. Indus., 457 F.2d 91, 95 (8th Cir. 1972), the court held that if both
employer and employee agree to waive their contractual grievance mechanisms, they may proceed
directly to court.
71. If every employee is to be free to institute suits directly against his employer for
every incident which he claims to be a violation of some right under the collective bar-
gaining agreement, little benefit is to be gained by any of the parties either from union
representation or arbitration clauses.
Belk v. Allied Aviation Serv. Co., 315 F.2d 513, 516 (1963).
72. See Simpson & Berwick, supra note 49, at 1199. See generally Note, supra note 63, at
112-13. "[T]he most frequent result of this additional exhaustion requirement may unfortunately
be the 'exhaustion' of deserving employees before they are able to obtain judicial relief for their
wrongful discharge." Dorn v. Meyer Parking Sys., 395 F. Supp. 779, 783 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
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his pleadings in terms of one of the established exceptions, he can ei-
ther bypass the contractual grievance procedure or treat it as an op-
tional avenue of redress. In such a situation, he can sue his employer
under section 301(a) for breach of the collective bargaining
agreement.73
A. Statutory Exceptions
Unions may relinquish many individual rights in the collective bar-
gaining process.74 Congress, however, has deemed some employee in-
terests so critical that they require separate statutes for their
protection.75 As a corollary to their favored status, courts will protect
these rights without first requiring exhaustion of the contractual
procedures.
In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. ,76 the Supreme Court held that
an employee's Title VII77 rights could not be compromised in a collec-
tive bargaining agreement. Accordingly, the Court indicated that if an
employer violates Title VII, the employee need not resort to the griev-
ance process before seeking relief in the district courts.78 The Court
also noted that despite the general rule of finality, a "binding" arbitra-
tion award will not bar a victim of employment discrimination from
obtaining judicial redress.79
73. For an early discussion of employee suits without exhausting contractual remedies, see
Blumrosen, supra note 19, at 1460-64.
74. See Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270 (1956).
75. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-15 (1976) (protection
against employment discrimination); Fair Labor Standards Act, §§ 1-19, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219
(1976) (protection for employee wage and hour claims).
76. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
77. Civil Rights Act of 1964, tit. VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-15 (1976).
78. 415 U.S. at 59-60.
79. Id. Early cases recognized that Title VII would aid those employees whose interests were
frequently not served by arbitration. See Hutchings v. United States Indus., Inc., 428 F.2d 303,
311 (5th Cir. 1970) ("[a]n arbitration award, whether adverse or favorable to the employee, is not
per se conclusive of the determination of Title VII rights"); Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416
F.2d 711, 714-15 (7th Cir. 1969) (employee may elect to use Title VII in lieu of arbitration pro-
ceeding). See generally Developments in the Law-Emloyment Discrimination and Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of1964, 84 HARV. L. REv. 1109 (1971); 10 Hous. L. REV. 750 (1973). But c.
Shudtz v. Dean Witter & Co., Inc., 418 F. Supp. 14 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (if employee institutes admin-
istrative proceedings, they must be exhausted before a Title VII action will be entertained in
federal court).
The principle of Gardner-Denver can be used to overturn a "binding" arbitration if a Title VII
claim is involved. See Oppenheim, Gateway, & Alexander-Whither Arbitration?, 48 TUL. L.
REv. 973 (1974).
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The courts have found in the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) °
another statutorily derived interest that need not initially be pursued
through the grievance procedure."' In Leone v. Mobil Oil Corp.,82 the
D.C. Circuit held that since the FLSA antedated section 301(a) and
contained jurisdictional and remedial provisions, an employee with a
wage and hour claim need only submit to the grievance procedure as
an optional remedy.83 Subsequent cases, however, have not always al-
lowed the employee to waive his internal remedies.8 4 The possibility of
obtaining immediate judicial redress of wage and hour disputes will be
slight if the complaint requires the resolution of numerous factual
issues.8 5
Courts have occasionally used two other labor statutes as exceptions
to the exhaustion doctrine. In United States Bulk Carriers, Inc. v.
Arguelles, 6 the Court allowed a maritime employee to supersede his
union's arbitration procedures and to sue his employer directly under a
Title VII, however, does not supersede the collective bargaining process. See Emporium Cap-
well Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 420 U.S. 50 (1975). In Emporium Capwell, plain-
tiffs charged they were the victims of employment discrimination and began to picket in violation
of the collective agreement. The Court upheld their subsequent discharge because they were in-
terfering with their bargaining agent's role as exclusive representative.
80. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-229 (1976).
81. This exception developed in a series of wage and hour disputes in the early 1940's. Bal-
lard v. Consolidated Steel Corp., 61 F. Supp. 996, 997-98 (S.D. Cal. 1945) (agreement to arbitrate
void because of conflict with rights under FLSA); Bailey v. Karolyna Co., 50 F. Supp. 142, 144
(S.D.N.Y. 1943) (arbitration clause under collective bargaining agreement has no relation to
plaintiff's claim, which arises under FLSA); Garrity v. Bagold Corp., 180 Misc. 120, 121, 42
NY.S.2d 257, 258 (Sup. Ct. 1943) (FLSA claim beyond scope of arbitration clause); City Bank
Farmers Trust Co. v. O'Donnell, 179 Misc. 770, 771, 39 N.Y.S.2d 842, 843 (Sup. Ct. 1943) (same);
City Serv. Cleaning Contractors, Inc. v. Vanzo, 179 Misc. 368, 368, 39 N.Y.S.2d 24, 24 (Sup. Ct.
1942) (arbitration is a remedial right; right to sue under FLSA is a substantive right).
82. 523 F.2d 1153 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
83. Id. at 1157-58. See also Iowa Beef Packers, Inc. v. Thompson, 405 U.S. 228, 229-30
(1972) (per curiam); Phillips v. Carborundum Co., 361 F. Supp. 1016, 1021 (W.D.N.Y. 1973). See
generaly 18 WAYNE L. REv. 1465 (1972).
84. See Beckley v. Teyssier, 332 F.2d 495, 496-97 (9th Cir. 1964) (FLSA does not preclude
arbitration of claims arising under it); Donahue v. Susquehanna Collieries Co., 160 F.2d 661, 664
(3d Cir. 1947) (second appeal, issue properly referable to arbitration); Watkins v. Hudson Coal
Co., 151 F.2d 311, 320 (3d Cir. 1945) (although the sufficiency of the wage scale formula is a
question for the court, other questions, such as hours worked, status as employee, and amount
due, are referable to arbitration). But cf. Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 414 U.S. 368, 376 (1974)
(contract arbitration procedures are not preempted by the independent operation of the Federal
Coal Mine Health and Safety Act, § 303, 30 U.S.C. § 863 (1976)). See also 10 GA. L. Rav. 843,
855 (1976).
85. See note 84 supra.
86. 400 U.S. 351 (1971).
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statute that granted exclusive federal jurisdiction to decide maritime
wage controversies.8 7 The Supreme Court held that since section 301
"is silent on the abrogation of existing statutory remedies of seamen
. . . , we construe it to provide only an optional remedy to them."88
The Court has carved out an additional bypass mechanism for post-
merger railroad employees whose wage benefits have been infringed by
corporate restructuring. In Norfolk & Western Railway v. Nemitz, 9 the
Court decided that in these circumstances an employee could sue to
protect his interests under section 5(2)(f) of the Interstate Commerce
Act.90
The Leone, Arguelles, and Nemitz statutory exceptions may provide
an option for the employee who fails to resort to the contractual griev-
ance procedure. If an employee can fashion his claim under a labor
statute that antedates section 301(a) and contains broad jurisdictional
provisions, he may gain a judicial forum. Further, by captioning his
pleadings in terms of a denial of a wages and hours claim under FLSA,
the employee may also find the courts sympathetic to his direct
action.91
87. Act of July 20, 1790, § 6, 46 U.S.C. § 596 (1970), provides in pertinent part:
The master or owner of any vessel making coasting voyages shall pay to every seaman
his wages within two days after the termination of the agreement under which he was
shipped, or at the time such seaman is discharged, whichever first happens .... Every
master or owner who refuses or neglects to make payment in the manner hereinbefore
mentioned without sufficient cause shall pay to the seaman a sum equal to two days' pay
for each and every day during which payment is delayed beyond the respective periods,
which sum shall be recoverable as wages in any claim made before the court ....
400 U.S. at 353 (emphasis added by Court).
88. 400 U.S. at 357-58.
89. 404 U.S. 37 (1971).
90. Id. at 40-43. Section 5(2)(f) of the Interstate Commerce Act, 49 U.S.C. § 5(2)(f) (1970),
provides:
As a condition of its approval, under this paragraph, of any transaction involving a car-
rier or carriers by railroad subject to the provisions of this chapter, the Commission shall
require a fair and equitable arrangement to protect the interests of the railroad employ-
ees affected. In its order of approval the Commission shall include terms and conditions
providing that during the period of four years from the effective date of such order such
transaction will not result in employees of the carrier or carriers by railroad affected by
such order being in a worse position with respect to their employment. ...
91. Cf. McKinney v. Missouri-Kan.-Tex. R.R., 357 U.S. 265, 268 (1958) (returning service-
man not required to pursue grievance procedure when asserting veterans' reemployment rights).
But see Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 414 U.S. 368 (1974) (collective bargaining agreement re-
quired arbitration of disputes over violations of the Federal Coal Mine Health & Safety Act,
§ 303, 30 U.S.C. § 863 (1976)).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1978/iss4/12
Number 4] ALTERNATIVES TO THE GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE
B. Judicial Exceptions
Without the aid of labor statutes, courts have found in other contexts
that litigants need not submit to contractual grievance procedures.
There is, of course, no exhaustion requirement when the collective bar-
gaining agreement fails to stipulate a grievance procedure92 or has
lapsed.93 Most collective bargaining contracts, however, contain inter-
nal dispute mechanisms;94 therefore the former is not a frequently used
exception. There appears to be no need to submit to a contractual
grievance procedure if, by its terms, it is not an exclusive remedy95 or
when the contract or procedure is inapplicable to the kind of dispute in
issue.
96
In Vaca v. S&Oes,97 the Supreme Court recognized the right of an
employee to bypass the grievance procedure when the employer repu-
diates the collective bargaining agreement. 98 The exception is a limited
one, however; mere breach of the collective bargaining contract, said
the Court, did not amount to its repudiation.99 Paca seems applicable,
therefore, only when the employer egregiously violates the employment
92. See Local 103, IBEW v. RCA Corp., 516 F.2d 1336, 1339 (3d Cir. 1975); Atlantic Steel
Co. v. Kitchens, 79 L.R.R.M. 2620 (Ga. 1970); Barr v. Formosa Prods., Inc., 76 L.R.R.M. 2743
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1971).
93. Cf. Procter & Gamble Independent Union v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 312 F.2d 181
(2d Cir. 1962) (union cannot force employer to arbitrate dispute when collective bargaining agree-
ment has expired).
94. See B. MELTZER, supra note 20, at 758.
95. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 184 n.9 (1967); Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379
U.S. 650, 657-58 (1965). But see Desrosiers v. American Cyanamid Co., 377 F.2d 864, 870 (2d Cir.
1967).
96. See Harrison v. Chrysler Corp., 558 F.2d 1273, 1276-77 (7th Cir. 1977) (where back
wages claim would not be granted under the terms of the collective agreement, employee need not
resort to grievance procedures). See also Frederickson v. Systems Fed'n of Ry. Employees, 436
F.2d 764, 768 (9th Cir. 1970). At least one court has dispensed with the exhaustion requirement
when "unreasonable" delay will result. See Local 28, IBEW v. IBEW, 197 F. Supp. 99, 107 (D.
Md. 1961).
It is logical to assume that the employee who may avail himself of a contract grievance proce-
dure possesses more job protection than his unorganized counterpart; however "in [the] absence of
an arbitration clause in the labor-management contract, an individual grievant has the right to
judicial remedy without proving union bad faith." Marclione, supra note 31, at 745.
97. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
98. Id. at 185. See also Chapman v. United Aircraft Co., 67 Lab. Cas. (CCH) 12338 (E.D.
Pa. 1971).
99. 386 U.S. at 185. In defining the repudiation doctrine, the Vaca Court cited only Drake
Bakeries, Inc. v. Local 50, Bakery Workers, 370 U.S. 254, 260-63 (1962) (one-day strike is not a
repudiation justifying employer's refusal to arbitrate), and 6A A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1443
(1962). Both of these authorities indicate that mere breach of the agreement does not amount to
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agreement."°° Paralleling the logic of Vaca, in Glover v. St. Louis-San
Francisco Railway,101 the Court noted that where the union and the
employer agree to discriminate against the employee, there is an "obvi-
ous" exception to the exhaustion requirement because its pursuit will
be "wholly futile."' 2 This exception, however, will not find a receptive
judicial response if the employee merely alleges that union-employer
collusion has rendered submission to the grievance process useless.103
Courts require specific factual allegations accompanied by supporting
affidavits before a litigant may bring himself within the ambit of
Glover.'14
The Glover and Vaca decisions constitute an eminently sensible ap-
proach and have been followed by a few perceptive lower courts.105
These decisions embrace the manifest notion that a worker victimized
by employer or union malfeasance should not have to submit to a futile
grievance procedure.
A few courts have carved out an additional exception to the exhaus-
tion doctrine by applying estoppel principles. 0 6 Thus, if an employer
its repudiation. Seegenerall, Neider v. J.G. Van Holton & Son, Inc., 41 Wis. 2d 602, 165 N.W.2d
113 (1969).
100. See Simpson & Berwick, supra note 49, at 1203.
101. 393 U.S. 324 (1969).
102. Id. at 330 (citing Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 184-85 (1967)). Although suggested excep-
tions, such as futility or repudiation, are related to the duty of fair representation, see Simpson &
Berwick, supra note 49, at 1212, it is helpful to treat them as separate exceptions for analytical
clarity and to suggest alternative means to fashion pleading counts. A few courts have derived a
more limited holding from Glover by restricting the futility exception to race discrimination cases.
See Fulson v. United-Buckingham Freight Lines, Inc., 324 F. Supp. 135, 137 n.1 (W.D. Mo.
1970) (alternative holding); Bower v. Lockheed-Georgia Co., 309 F. Supp. 1210, 1215 (N.D. Ga.
1970).
103. See Aldridge v. Ludwig-Honold Mfg. Co., 385 F. Supp. 695, 699 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (allega-
tions of conspiracy do not mitigate duty to exhaust contractual remedies); Long Island City Lodge
2147 v. Railway Express Agency, 217 F. Supp. 907, 910 (S:D.N.Y. 1963) (mere claim of futility
insufficient); Durandetti v. Chrysler Corp., 195 F. Supp. 653, 656 (E.D. Mich. 1961) (allegations of
futility or hostility do not mitigate duty to exhaust contractual remedies).
104. See, e.g., Lusk v. Eastern Prods. Corp., 427 F.2d 705, 708 (4th Cir. 1970); Hardastle v.
Western Greyhound Lines, 303 F.2d 182, 186 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 920 (1962).
105. See generally Imel v. Zohn Mfg. Co., 481 F.2d 181, 184 (10th Cir. 1973) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 415 U.S. 915 (1974); Smith v. Pittsburgh Gage & Supply Co., 464 F.2d 870 (3d Cir.
1972); Abrams v. Carrier Corp., 434 F.2d 1234, 1245 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1009
(1971); Price v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 46 F.R.D. 18 (E.D. Pa. 1969). See also Flynn &
Higgins, supra note 49, at 1140-41.
106. "An employer may be estopped from a defense that an employee in a collective bargain-
ing agreement has not exhausted his administrative remedies." Day v. UAW Local 36, 466 F.2d
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incorrectly instructs an employee about how to process a grievance, or
indicates that he will satisfy the claim without formal proceedings, such
actions will bar a subsequent defense of failure to exhaust contractual
remedies.10 7 Courts reason that although the employer is not obligated
to aid the grievant in his action, any assistance it provides must not be
misleading.10
8
Another doctrine that aids aggrieved employees is the union's duty
of fair representation."° If a worker can demonstrate that the union
has breached its duty of fair representation in handling his complaint,
he need not submit to the grievance procedure and risk the subsequent
bar of an adverse arbitration decision."t0 In such circumstances, some
courts will allow the employee to pursue his cause of action against a
recalcitrant employer."'
In 1944, in Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad,"2 the Court
enunciated the duty of fair representation to counter racial discrimina-
tion within unions." 3 In Steele, a railway union attempted to negotiate
a contract with the employer railroad that would have effectively pre-
83, 93 (6th Cir. 1972) (employer cannot claim that employee had filed grievance with an unauthor-
ized representative after holding him out as authorized); Ruggireilo v. Ford Motor Co., 411 F.
Supp. 758, 762 (E.D. Mich. 1976) (union estopped from asserting employee's failure to exhaust
internal remedies when failure was due to union's misrepresentation). See also Steinman v.
Spector Freight Sys., Inc., 441 F.2d 599, 603 (2d Cir. 1971).
107. See Day v. UAW Local 36, 466 F.2d 83, 93-94 (6th Cir. 1972). But see Newgent v.
Modine Mfg. Co., 495 F.2d 919, 927-28 (7th Cir. 1974).
By becoming a member of the union Newgent was contractually obligated to ... be-
come aware of the nature and availability of union remedies. Newgent was not justified
in remaining in ignorance of the provisions governing his own or, in fact, of relying on a
statement by an officer that there was nothing he could do.
Id.
108. Stroman v. Santa Fe Ry., 161 Cal. App. 2d 151, 166, 326 P.2d 155, 164 (1958).
109. The duty of fair representation should remain distinct from issues of exhaustion of con-
tractual remedies. "However, failure to exhaust such remedies is a defense available to the union
because of considerations unrelated to the question of whether a wrong has been committed by
it." Harrison v. Chrysler Corp., 558 F.2d 1273, 1277 (7th Cir. 1977) (citing Brady v. Trans World
Airlines, Inc., 401 F.2d 87 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1048 (1969)).
110. See Summers, supra note 49, at 1086-92. See generally Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight,
Inc., 424 U.S. 554, 567-69 (1976).
111. For contemporary discussions of the duty of fair representation, see Clark, The Duty of
Fair Representation:/A Theoretical Structure, 51 TEx. L. REv. 1119 (1973); Flynn & Higgins, supra
note 49, at 1099-1131; Tobias, supra note 57; Tobias, supra note 25; 19 VILL. L. Rv. 885 (1974).
112. 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
113. See generally Brotherhood of R.R Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U.S. 768 (1952); Tunstall v.
Brotherhood of Locomotive Fireman, 323 U.S. 210 (1944). For a developmental history of the
duty of fair representation, see Comment, supra note 31, at 89.
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cluded all blacks from union membership. 1 4 The Court noted that the
principle of exclusivity in a collective bargaining context allowed the
union representatives broad opportunities to discriminate within its
rank and file.115 The Court went on to hold that in the administration
of a collective bargaining agreement, the union must "exercise fairly
the power conferred upon it in behalf of all those for whom it acts,
without hostile discrimination against them.""' 6
Although the Court decided Steele under the Railway Labor Act," 17
the duty of fair representation applies to all workers covered by the
National Labor Relations Act." 8 Further, the fair representation duty
is not limited to race;119 the union must fairly represent all its mem-
bers."12 The Court later broadened its theme of fairness, holding, in
Humphrey v. Moore,12t that the union must act with good faith and
avoid dealing arbitrarily with its members.'
22
These principles were left relatively unchanged until 1967. In Vaca
v. S#pes," 3 the Court noted: "A breach of the statutory duty of fair
representation occurs only when a union's conduct toward a member of
the collective bargaining unit is arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad
faith." 24 When the union acts in bad faith, the employee need not rely
114. 323 U.S. at 195.
115. Id. at 201.
116. Id. at 203.
117. Id. at 193-94; 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-163 (1970).
118. Judicial interpretations of the National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, §§ 1-19, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 151-168 (1976), attributed the duty of fair representation to the Act because the principle of
exclusivity, found in both statutes, is the duty's source. See Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S.
330 (1953).
119. See Alabaugh v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 222 F.2d 861 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 839
(1959).
120. Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 337 (1953).
121. 375 U.S. 335 (1964).
122. Id. at 342. The international or national union organization may also owe a duty to its
local members. See, eg., Parmer v. National Cash Register Co., 503 F.2d 275, 276 (6th Cir. 1974)
(per curiam); Local 90, Am. Flint Glass Workers v. American Flint Glass Workers, 374 F. Supp.
600, 606-08 (D. Md. 1974).
123. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
124. Id. at 190. The Court further noted that this duty protects the employee who has relin-
quished the ability to sue his employer. Id. at 182. See generally Clark, supra note 111, at 1131;
Cox, supra note 13, at 632; Summers, supra note 49, at 256.
The effect of the contractual provisions giving the union exclusive control over the griev-
ance procedure is to deprive the individual of his ability to enforce the contract on his
own behalf. The union, having deprived the individual of his ability to enforce his
rights, has a special obligation to act on his behalf.
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upon the grievance procedure and can proceed directly to the courts. 125
The Court described the nature of fair representation as placing a
continuing obligation on the union: "[A]s the exclusive bargaining rep-
resentative of the employees ... , the Union had a statutory duty to
fairly represent all of those employees, both in its collective bargaining
...and in its enforcement of the resulting collective bargaining agree-
ment . .. 2. Union officials owe this duty of fair representation to
all those within the collective bargaining unit1 27 without regard to
union membership.' 21
125. 386 U.S. at 184-87.
126. Id. at 177 (citations omitted). The Court's reference in Vaca to the "statutory" duty of
fair representation was figurative. "Federal labor policy does not 'necessarily' require the recogni-
tion of a duty of fair representation at all. But federal common law implied from the statutory
authority conferred upon collective bargaining representatives has recognized the need to place
limitations upon the power of the recognized bargaining representative to injure minorities.
Need v. UMW, 556 F.2d 190, 200 (3d Cir. 1977), cer. denied, 434 U.S. 1013 (1978).
127. Under this [fair representation] doctrine, the exclusive agent's statutory authority to
represent all members of a designated unit includes a statutory obligation to serve the
interests of all members without hostility or discrimination toward any, to exercise its
discretion with complete good faith and honesty, and to avoid arbitrary conduct.
386 U.S. at 177.
128. The ability of the employee to refuse to join the union depends on the contractual union
security agreement. Section 8(a)(3) of the National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a)(3) (1976), provides in pertinent part: "Provided, That nothing in this subehapter, or in
any other statute of the United States, shall preclude an employer from making an agreement with
a labor organization. . . to require as a condition of employment membership therein on or after
the thirtieth day following the beginning of such employment ....
The agency shop. . . removes that choice from the union and places the option of mem-
bership in the employee while still requiring the same monetary support as does the
union shop. Such a difference between the union and agency shop may be of great
importance in some contexts, but for present purposes it is more formal than real.
NLRB v. General Motors Corp., 373 U.S. 734, 744 (1963).
The most common forms of union security agreements are the agency shop, the union shop, the
maintenance of membership agreement, the dues checkoff system, and the closed shop. The
agency shop arrangement generally makes union membership optional, but imposes a financial
obligation on nonmembers to support the union as their bargaining agent. This financial obliga-
tion, however, is often equivalent to the amount members pay. See R. GORMAN, supra note 7, at
642. In a union shop, the employee is required to join the union within a specified number of days
as a condition to his continued employment. See OiL Chemical, & Atomic Workers v. Mobil Oil
Corp., 426 U.S. 407, 409 n.l (1976). A maintenance of membership agreement "imposes no obli-
gation to join a union but merely an obligation to remain a member once having voluntarily
become one." R. GORMAN, supra note 7, at 642. The dues checkoff arrangement does not require
union membership, but the employer automatically deducts union dues from the employee's earn-
ings and remits it to the designated bargaining representative. See id at 642-43. The closed shop
requires the employer to hire only those workers who have already joined the union. Closed shop
arrangements are prohibited by the National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, § 8(a)(3), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(a)(3) (1976): "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer. . . by discrimination in
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Although the existence of a fair representation duty is beyond dis-
pute, judicially formulated standards defining a breach crippled its
usefulness as a mechanism for circumventing the contractual grievance
procedure. In Vaca,129 the Supreme Court took its most definitive
stance on the duty, noting that a meritorious grievance and a union
failure to take the claim to arbitration did not constitute a breach un-
less the union acted arbitrarily or in bad faith.130
Since Paca, the Supreme Court has had two opportunities to expli-
cate the elements of a breach of the fair representation duty. In Amal-
gamated Association of Street, Electric Railway & Motor Coach
Employees v. Lockridge,13 1 an employee sought recovery for back
wages allegedly due because of his union's failure to pursue his wrong-
ful discharge action.'32 After quoting the Vaca language concerning
the necessity of showing bad faith or arbitrary action, 133 the Court went
on to require the worker to show "substantial evidence of fraud, deceit-
ful action or dishonest conduct."'134 In Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight,
Inc.,135 an employee sought to maintain a similar wrongful discharge
regard to hire or tenure of employment ... to encourage or discourage membership in any labor
organization .... Id. This portion of§ 8(a)(3) does not protect preconditioning security agree-
ments. The preceding security agreements, however, may be prohibited if the state in which they
are to operate has passed "right-to-work" legislation pursuant to Id § 164(b) ("[nlothing in this
subchapter shall be construed as authorizing the execution or application of agreements requiring
membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment in any State or Territory in
which such execution or application is prohibited by State or Territorial law").
Since the employee will usually bear his fair share of the costs of union representation regard-
less of formal union membership, he should be entitled to full and active representation. See
Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 220-22 (1977). In some circumstances, the union
must act fairly toward workers who are not within the bargaining unit. See Brotherhood of R.R.
Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U.S. 768 (1952) (union may not discriminate against workers outside
their bargaining unit); O'Neill v. Public Law Bd., 581 F.2d 692 (7th Cir. 1978) (union duty to
fairly represent its members does not terminate upon their dismissal); Need v. UMW, 556 F.2d
190 (3d Cir. 1977) (although no duty of fair representation is owed to retirees in resolving pension
difficulties, if union undertakes to secure remedies, it must not discriminate against them), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1013 (1978). See generally Goetz, Developing Federal Labor Law of Welfare and
Pension Plans, 55 CORNELL L. REv. 911, 913-14 (1970).
129. 386 U.S. at 171.
130. Id. at 193-95. See Feller, Vaca v. Sipes: One Year Later, in PROCEEDINGS OF NEW YORK
UNIVERSITY TWENTY-FIRST ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR LAW 141, 160-80 (1968).
131. 403 U.S. 274 (1971).
132. Id. at 277.
133. 386 U.S. at 193-95.
134. 403 U.S. at 299 (quoting Humphrey v. Moore, 375 U.S. 335, 348 (1964)).
135. 424 U.S. 554 (1976).
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claim.' 36 In reversing the appellate court's summary award in favor of
the employer,137 Justice White said that a union fulfills its fair repre-
sentation duty by acting honestly.' 38 He also added that judgment er-
rors would not be sufficient to show breach of the duty.' 39
The Supreme Court's somewhat vague articulations of the proof re-
quired to demonstrate a breach of the fair representation duty have
produced two disparate applications in the lower courts. The prevail-
ing decisions in the Sixth and Ninth Circuits have taken a liberal ap-
proach, repudiating the bad faith requirement and using a more
objective focus to assess the union's treatment of a grievance. 140 These
courts do not require the employee to demonstrate the union's subjec-
tive bad faith, or allow the union to assert that they have fulfilled their
duty to a member in the face of their negligent representation.' 4' The
remainder of the circuits, however, continue to require a showing of
bad faith.' 42
136. Id. at 556-57.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 564.
139. Id. at 571.
140. Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp., 528 F.2d 912, 913 (6th Cir. 1975) (unexplained union
conduct held to be a fair representation breach); Duggan v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 510
F.2d 1086, 1088 (9th Cir. 1975) (showing of bad faith not required); Beriaculo v. International
Longshoremen's Union, 501 F.2d 258, 264 (9th Cir. 1974) (union must balance its interests on the
facts of each case); Johnson v. General Drivers, Warehousemen and Helpers, Local 89, 488 F.2d
250, 252 (6th Cir. 1973) (interpreted Vaca as requiring union good faith); Kesinger v. Universal
Airlines, Inc., 474 F.2d 1127, 1131 (6th Cir. 1973) (objective criteria used to analyze union's dili-
gence of representation); Dill v. Greyhound Corp., 435 F.2d 231, 238 (6th Cir. 1970) (reckless
union conduct sufficient to show breach); Hershman v. Sierra Pac. Power Co., 434 F. Supp. 46, 49
(D. Nev. 1977) (showing of bad faith not required); Ruggirello v. Ford Motor Co., 411 F. Supp.
758, 760 (E.D. Mich. 1976) (union's negligence is breach of fair representation duty). But see
Thomas v. Ford Motor Co., 396 F. Supp. 52, 57 (E.D. Mich. 1973) (union's conduct need only be
rational); Provenzino v. Merchants' Forwarding, 363 F. Supp. 168, 175 (E.D. Mich. 1973) (negli-
gence insufficient to show breach).
141. See cases cited in note 140 supra.
142. For an overview of the Second Circuit approach, see Jackson v. Trans World Airlines,
Inc., 457 F.2d 202, 204 (2d Cir. 1972) (hostile discrimination or factual malice must be shown to
find a breach of the duty of fair representation); Hiatt v. New York Cent. R.R., 444 F.2d 1397,
1398 (2d Cir. 1971) (same); Simberlund v. Long Island R.R., 421 F.2d 1219, 1225 (2d Cir. 1970)
(bad faith); Nagel v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 396 F. Supp. 391, 394 (E.D.N.Y. 1975)
(negligence insufficient).
For representative Third Circuit cases, see Bazarte v. United Transp. Union, 429 F.2d 868, 872
(3d Cir. 1970) (negligence or poor judgment insufficient); Brady v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 401
F.2d 87, 104 (3d Cir. 1968) (malice and bad faith), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1048 (1969); Dorn v.
Meyers Parking Sys., 395 F. Supp. 779, 782 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (arbitrary and capricious conduct);
Marsuilo v. General Motors Corp., 393 F. Supp. 188, 195 (D.N.J. 1975) (negligence insufficient);
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The bad faith or arbitrary treatment standard offers a means to at-
tack blatant union misconduct such as employer-union collusion 43 or
overt union hostility. 144 Judicial implementation, however, has placed
this standard beyond the reach of many employee allegations. 4  Most
courts require a claimant to demonstrate the subjective motive or intent
of the union representative in the handling of his grievance. 146 As long
as the union can show its action or inaction was free from obvious im-
propriety, the employee, in all likelihood, will be unable to prove bad
faith. 147 The difficulty establishing bad faith is further compounded by
the frequent presumption of union rectitude 48 and the broad standard
Luca v. Philco-Ford Corp., 380 F. Supp. 139, 145 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (fraud, deceit, or dishonest
conduct).
The Fourth Circuit seems to require arbitrary union conduct. See, e.g., Harrison v. United
Transp. Union, 530 F.2d 558, 561 (4th Cir. 1975); Griffin v. UAW, 469 F.2d 181, 183 (4th Cir.
1972).
For Fifth Circuit views, see Coe v. United Rubber Workers, 571 F.2d 1349, 1350 (5th Cir. 1978)
(per curiam) (union did not breach duty of fair representation despite "careless" error in im-
properly filing employee's arbitration appeal); Sanderson v. Ford Motor Co., 483 F.2d 102, 110
(5th Cir. 1973) (arbitrary action, absent showing of bad faith, is sufficient); Encina v. Tony Lama
Boot Co., 448 F.2d 1264, 1264-65 (5th Cir. 1971) (per curiam) (bad faith); Freeman v. Grand Int'l
Bhd., 375 F. Supp. 81, 93 (S.D. Ga.) (breach depends on intent), aft'd, 493 F.2d 628 (5th Cir.
1974).
- For the Seventh Circuit approach, see Dwyer v. Climatrol Indus., Inc., 544 F.2d 307, 311 (7th
Cir. 1976) (negligence insufficient), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1099 (1977); Canna v. Consolidated
Freightways Corp., 524 F.2d 290, 293 (7th Cir. 1975) (negligence or poor judgment insufficient);
Williams v. General Foods Corp., 492 F.2d 399, 405 (7th Cir. 1974) (discriminatory intent
required).
For the Eighth Circuit approach, see Russom v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 558 F.2d 439, 442 (8th
Cir. 1977) (errors in judgment or negligence insufficient), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 955 (1978); Bond v.
International Bhd. of Teamsters, 521 F.2d 5, 9 (8th Cir. 1975) (union's poor judgment in not filing
grievance); Augspurger v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 510 F.2d 853, 859 (8th Cir. 1975)
(open hostility).
For the Tenth Circuit approach, see Woods v. North Am. Rockwell Corp., 480 F.2d 644, 648
(10th Cir. 1973) (arbitrary action); Reid v. UAW, 479 F.2d 517, 520 (10th Cir. 1973) (deceit, dis-
honesty, or intentional and severe discrimination).
143. See Hotel & Restaurant Employees v. Michelson's Food Servs., Inc., 545 F.2d 1248 (9th
Cir. 1976); Balowski v. UAW, 372 F.2d 829 (6th Cir. 1967); Clark, supra note 111, at 1132.
144. See Augspurger v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 510 F.2d 853 (8th Cir. 1975).
145. Emporium Capwell Co. v. Western Addition Community Org., 420 U.S. 50, 73-74
(Douglas, J., dissenting). See generally Rosen, Fair Representation, Contract Breach and Fiduciary
Obligations: Unions, Union Offcials and the Worker in Collective Bargaining, 15 HASnNGs L.J.
391, 399 (1962).
146. See note 140 supra.
147. See Tobias, supra note 57, at 528. See generaly Note, supra note 18, at 1200.
148. See Comment, supra note 35, at 232. See also Local 12, United Rubber Workers v.
NLRB, 368 F.2d 12, 23 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 837 (1967).
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of reasonableness allowed to justify union actions. 149
If the bad faith standard involves a subjective determination of in-
tent, the union representative may claim that he has fairly assisted the
worker despite his gross negligence.150 Continued adherence to this
subjective approach substantially contributes to the employee's inabil-
ity to demonstrate a breach of the duty of fair representation. 151
V. OTHER IMPEDIMENTS TO AN EMPLOYEE'S JUDICIAL ACCESS
Assuming he has brought himself within one of the previously men-
tioned exceptions, or has been able to demonstrate that his union has
breached its duty of fair representation, the employee suing outside the
grievance procedure frequently confronts other obstacles. Vaca v.
Sites'52 intimated that if an employee seeks judicial access by alleging
a breach of the fair representation duty, he must join both the employer
and the union.'5 3 Some courts have held that under such circumstances
both parties are indispensable.' 54 Unfortunately, joinder of the union
may only serve to strain further the employee's relations with it.'55 In
addition, when the employee pursues the action with the union joined
as a defendant, he faces the combined legal resources of both the union
and the employer. 56
149. "A wide range of reasonableness must be allowed a statutory bargaining representative in
serving the unit it represents .. " Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338 (1953). See
generally Rosen, supra note 145, at 402-09; Summers, supra note 49, at 1052.
When the parties have negotiated a collective bargaining agreement, a codified instrument ex-
ists that usually stipulates the respective parties' rights in the agreement's administration. Accord-
mgly, it has been argued that at the administration stage, there is no need to allow the union the
same amount of discretion afforded them in executing the agreement. See Clark, supra note 111,
at 1155-74; Rosen, supra note 145, at 405; Summers, supra note 49, at 254.
150. Cf., e.g., Brough v. United Steelworkers, 437 F.2d 748 (1st Cir. 1971) (negligence insuffi-
dent); Bazarte v. United Transp. Union, 429 F.2d 868 (3d Cir. 1970) (same). See also note 144
supra.
151. See generally Citron, Deferral of Employee Rights to Arbitration: An Evolving Dichotomy
by the Burger Court, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 369, 385 (1976).
152. 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
153. Id. at 197.
154. Leskiw v. Local 1470, IBEW, 464 F.2d 721 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1041 (1972);
Nix v. Spector Freight Sys., Inc., 264 F.2d 875 (3d Cir. 1959). See generally Note, The Duty ofFair
Representation and Its Applicability Wen a Union Refuses to Process an Individual's Grievance, 20
S.C.L. REv. 253, 266 (1968).
The employee must name both union and employer when alleging a conspiracy between the
union and the employer. See Chasis v. Progress Mfg. Co., 382 F.2d 773 (3d Cir. 1967).
155. See Tobias, supra note 57, at 516 n.9.
156. See 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1310 (1977).
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Procedural technicalities also frequently frustrate employee suits.
Some courts impose stricter pleading requirements' 57 than those ordi-
narily recognized under the federal rules.15 Courts require employee-
plaintiffs to state full factual pleadings with supporting affidavits before
their suits may progress.'5 9 Additionally, some courts apply the shorter
tort action statute of limitations. 160
Many courts are predisposed against a union member who fails to
resort to the contractual grievance procedure. Judges fear that by en-
couraging individual actions their dockets will swell with trivial com-
plaints of discontented union members.' 61  A desire to keep such
disputes in the hands of arbitrators also suggests that direct suits are
157. See, e.g., Williams v. General Foods Corp., 492 F.2d 399, 407 (7th Cir. 1974) (must state
supporting facts alleging discriminatory intent); Hardcastle v. Western Greyhound Lines, 303
F.2d 182, 186 (9th Cir.) (complaint alleging arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable union action
held defective because of failure to allege bad faith), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 920 (1962).
158. FED. R. Cw. P. 8(a) provides:
Claims for Relief A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief, whether an original
claim, counterclaim, crossclaim, or third-party claim, shall contain (1) a short and plain
statement of the grounds upon which the court's jurisdiction depends, unless the court
already has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new grounds ofjurisdiction to support it,
(2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,
and (3) a demand for judgment for the relief to which he deems himself entitled. Relief
in the alternative or of several different types may be demanded.
159. Lusk v. Eastern Prods. Corp., 427 F.2d 705, 708 (4th Cir. 1970) (allegations of breach of
fair representation duty must contain more than conclusory statements); Foy v. Norfolk & W. Ry.,
377 F.2d 243, 247 (4th Cir. 1967) (plaintiff must attach affidavits explaining and attesting to plead-
ings). In at least one decision the Supreme Court did not share this view of the pleading
requirements:
Although the complaint was not as specific with regard to union discrimination as might
have been desirable, we deem the complaint against the union sufficient to survive a
motion to dismiss. As the Court of Appeals indicated, "where the courts are called upon
to fulfill their role as the primary guardians of the duty of fair representation," com-
plaints should be construed to avoid dismissals.
Czosek v. O'Mara, 397 U.S. 25, 27 (1970). See also CSC Oil Co. v. NLRB, 549 F.2d 399, 400 (6th
Cir. 1977).
160. See DeArroyo v. Sindicato de Trabajadores Packinghouse, 425 F.2d 281, 287 (Ist Cir.)
(court characterized plaintiff's suit against union for breach of fair representation duty as tort
action, thus invoking one-year tort statute of limitations rather than five-year contract action stat-
ute), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 877 (1970). Other courts have noted that when the union fails to
administer the collective bargaining agreement in good faith, the duty of fair representation action
is more closely related to a contract action. See, e.g., Butler v. Teamsters Local 823, 514 F.2d 442,
447-48 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 924 (1975); Abrams v. Carrier Corp., 434 F.2d 1234, 1252
(2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1009 (1971). See generally Note, Statute of Limiations Gov-
erning Fair Representation Action Against Union When Brought with Section 301 Action Against
Employer, 44 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 418 (1976).
161. See generally Tobias, supra note 57, at 520. See also Encina v. Tony Lama Boot Co., 448
F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1971).
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not favored. 162 Finally, allowing disputes to proceed outside the con-




In most instances, implementation of the exhaustion doctrine is a
sound judicial policy. Its use promotes bilateral communication be-
tween labor and management' 64 and encourages private resolution of
industrial tension. 165 The tenet of union exclusivity in the processing of
employee grievances is equally sound. The diversity of interests that
abound in any labor organization requires that the power to make com-
promises and adjustments be vested in a single union representative. 1 66
The policy of union exclusivity, however, would impinge less fre-
quently upon individual employee interests if it were tempered by a
revitalization of the duty of fair representation. Foremost in such an
endeavor would be the replacement of the bad faith standard spawned
by Vaca and its progeny1 67 with a more equitable approach to fair rep-
resentation. The bad faith test mistakenly focuses on the subjective
motivation for the union agent's conduct. A better focus for the courts'
scrutiny is the adequacy of the remedy afforded the employee and the
degree of diligence the union exercised in securing it.
168
The duty of fair representation could become the safeguard it was
originally intended to be 169 if courts would review a union's treatment
of unsatisfied claims more objectively. The use of an objective stan-
dard would continue to satisfy the labor policy preference for private
settlements because the employee still would have to initially submit to
the grievance process.
The few courts that have used a more objective analysis demonstrate
the soundness of this approach. In Ruzicka v. General Motors Corp., 70
an employee was unable to arbitrate his discharge because the union
failed to file the appropriate request statements for the proceeding even
162. See text accompanying notes 55-57 supra.
163. See Ratner, supra note 26, at 261.
164. See text accompanying notes 50-59 supra.
165. See text accompanying notes 56-57 supra.
166. See Summers, supra note 49, at 253-54.
167. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967). See text accompanying notes 123-39 supra.
168. 386 U.S. at 179. See also Note, supra note 63, at 112.
169. See text accompanying notes 112-22 supra.
170. 523 F.2d 306 (6th Cir. 1975).
Number 4]
Washington University Open Scholarship
792 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 1978:765
after it had been given two opportunities to do so. 17' The district court,
though labeling the union's behavior negligent,172 found it free from
bad faith and thus upheld the denial of arbitration. 73 The Sixth Cir-
cuit reversed and held:
[W]hen a union makes no decision as to the merit of an individual's griev-
ance but merely allows it to expire by negligently failing to take a basic
and required step towards resolving it, the union has acted arbitrarily and
is liable for a breach of its duty of fair representation.' 74
Perhaps it is time for a reaffirmation of state court jurisdiction over
these suits. The employee unable to gain the assistance of his union
might wish to sue in a local jurisdiction with more favorable attitudes
toward individual SuitS.1 75 Although most cases in which an employee
brings an action against his employer under section 301(a) are brought
in federal court, state courts retain concurrent jurisdiction. 76 The em-
ployee might also benefit from a more conveniently located forum. 77
171. Id. at 308-09.
172. Id. at 309.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 310. In concurrence, Judge McCree said: "I believe that the incidence of an injury
of this magnitude should be shifted from the innocent employee to the union whose flagrant negli-
gence was responsible for it." Id. at 316 (McCree, J., concurring).
175. An extensive line of state court decisions requires only a good faith effort to exhaust
grievance procedures. See, e.g., Andrews v. Victor Metal Prods. Corp., 239 Ark. 763, 394 S.W.2d
123 (1965); Harrison v. Arrow Metal Prods. Corp., 20 Mich. App. 590, 174 N.W.2d 875 (1969);
Jones v. Operating Eng'rs, 72 N.M. 322, 383 P.2d 571 (1963); Addeo v. Dairymen's League Coop.
Ass'n, 47 Misc. 2d 426, 262 N.Y.S.2d 771 (Sup. Ct. 1965); Gillam v. Roadway Express, Inc., I
Ohio App. 2d 548, 206 N.E.2d 34 (1965); Gilstrap v. Mitchell Bros. Truck Lines, 270 Ore. 599, 529
P.2d 370 (1974); Wagner v. Columbia Hosp. Dist., 259 Ore. 15, 485 P.2d 421 (1971). In addition,
state courts have found a breach of the fair representation duty where there is a showing of negli-
gence. See, e.g., Zdero v. Briggs Mfg. Co., 338 Mich. 549, 61 N.W.2d 615 (1953); Handwerk v.
United Steelworkers, 67 Mich. App. 747, 242 N.W.2d 514 (1976); Marchitto v. Central R.R., 9 N.J.
456, 88 A.2d 851 (1952); DeMarco v. Thatcher Furnace Co., 102 N.J. Super. 258, 245 A.2d 773
(1968); Donnelly v. United Fruit Co., 75 NJ. Super. 383, 183 A.2d 415 (1962); Wheeler v. Interna-
tional Woodworkers, 274 Ore. 373, 547 P.2d 106 (1976); Falsetti v. Local 2026, UMW, 400 Pa. 145,
161 A.2d 882 (1960); O'Donnell v. Pabst Brewing Co., 12 Wis. 2d 491, 107 N.W.2d 484 (1961). But
see Sims v. Rex Paper Co., 26 Mich. App. 129, 182 N.W.2d 90 (1970).
176. International Ass'n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617, 620-21 (1958).
mo preclude a state court from exerting its traditional jurisdiction to determine and
enforce the rights of union membership would in many cases leave an unjustly ousted
member without remedy for the restoration of his important union rights. Such a drastic
result, on the remote possibility of some entanglement with the Board's enforcement of
the national policy, would require a more compelling indication of congressional will
than can be found in the interstices of the Taft-Hartley Act.
Id. at 620. See also notes 37-40 supra and accompanying text.
177. See Note, supra note 31, at 440.
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The frustrations of remediless employees possessing meritorious claims
offsets the risk of inconsistent rulings and forum shopping. '78 More-
over, since Teamsters Local 174 v. Lucas Flour Co. 179 held that state
law must yield to conflicting federal labor law, 80 the litigant will not be
seeking a divergent substantive forum, only a more sympathetic judi-
cial interpretation.' 8 '
If the union refuses to aid a worker who has been disserved by his
employer, perhaps the worker should have personal access to the griev-
ance and arbitration mechanisms.' 82 In the face of union obstinance,
such a procedure would allow the employee to assume the role of per-
sonal advocate. Under this approach, the worker would first file the
grievance with the union and await its action on his behalf. If unsatis-
fied with the treatment of his complaint, the employee would then pro-
ceed through the normal grievance steps as stipulated in the collective
bargaining agreement. The disruption of labor-management relations
would thus be minimal because the aggrieved individual would be re-
quired to follow the normal procedural steps. Fears of a deluge of
spurious claims could be dissipated by requiring the employee to as-
sume the costs of such an action if its merits proved to be nugatory.
8 3
VII. CONCLUSION
One of the primary purposes in promulgating the Labor-Manage-
178. Id.
179. 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
180. Id. at 104. See also Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson, 370 U.S. 195, 199 (1962). But cf.
Rehmar v. Smith, 555 F.2d 1362, 1368 (9th Cir. 1976) (compatible state law may be applied).
181. For a discussion of individual arbitration rights under state law, see Rosen, The Individual
Worker in Grievance Arbitration: Still Another Look at the Problem, 24 MD. L. Rav. 233 (1964).
182. In prior decisions, this Court has observed that the Labor Act recognizes the exist-
ence of private rights within the statutory scheme. These cases have, to be sure, empha-
sized the "public interest" factor. To employ the rhetoric of "public interest," however,
is not to imply that the public right excludes recognition of parochial private interests.
Local 283, UAW v. Scofield, 382 U.S. 205, 218 (1965). It has been suggested that private access to
the grievance and arbitration procedures could be attained through a revitalization of§ 9(a) of the
National Labor Relations (Wagner) Act, 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976). See Mitchell v. Hercules, Inc.,
410 F. Supp. 560, 565 (S.D. Ga. 1976); Tobias, supra note 57, at 558; note 58 supra and accompa-
nying text. One should be mindful that "the Labor Act was not intended to relegate workers with
lawsuits to the status of wards either of companies or of unions." Sinclair Ref. Co. v. Atkinson,
370 U.S. 195, 205 (1962) (Black, J., dissenting).
183. See Encina v. Tony Lama Boot Co., 448 F.2d 1264, 1265 (5th Cir. 1971); Donnelly v.
United Fruit Co., 40 NJ. 61, 92-93, 190 A.2d 825, 842 (1963). See generally Rosen, supra note
181. at 302.
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ment Relations Act was to safeguard individual rights from union
domination.'" Subsequent legislation reaffirmed the congressional de-
sire to protect the employee whose interests are no longer consistent
with those of his union."t 5 Although initial deference to the contractual
grievance procedure will ordinarily foster equitable resolution of labor-
management disputes,18 6 reliance on this process in the face of union
negligence leads to inequitable results. Justification of this deference,
judicially expressed by continued faith in the arbitration process 8 7 and
by viewing the grievance procedure as "chosen"' 88 by an employee as
his sole remedy, does not mitigate these results. When an employee has
no choice but to join a collective bargaining unit'89 or is unable to
reach the arbitration stage due to perfunctory union representation,190
the traditional rationales lose much of their validity.
Courts should note that the employee-plaintiff does not seek to su-
persede or preempt federal labor policy, but is merely searching for a
substitute corrective measure. Judicial refusal to hear meritorious em-
ployee claims can only promote dissatisfaction with the courts as well
as with unions. When this occurs, the violence of wildcat strikes or the
depletion of union membership due to organizational indifference may
184. Section 1(a) of the Labor-Management Relations (Taft-Hartley) Act, 29 U.S.C. § 141(b)
(1976), provides:
It is the purpose and policy of this Chapter, in order to promote the full flow of com-
merce, to prescribe the legitimate rights of both employees and employers in their rela-
tions affecting commerce, to provide orderly and peaceful procedures for preventing the
interference by either with the legitimate rights of the other, [and) to protect the rights of
individual employees in their relations with labor organizations ....
185. Any person whose rights secured by the provisions of this subchapter have been
infringed.. . may bring a civil action in a district court of the United States for such
relief (including injunctions) as may be appropriate. Any such action against a labor
organization shall be brought in the district court of the United States for the district
where the alleged violation occurred, or where the principal office of such labor organi-
zation is located.
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure (Landrum-Griffin) Act, § 102, 29 U.S.C. § 412
(1976).
186. See ABA SECTION OF LABOR RELATIONs LAW, REPORT OF THE COMMITrEE ON LABOR
ARBITRATION 55, 75-76 (1957).
187. See text accompanying notes 50-61 supra.
188. "We are not compelling any party to agree to arbitrate disputes arising during a contract
term, but are merely giving full effect to their own voluntary agreement to submit all such disputes
to arbitration." Collyer Insulated Wire Co. v. Local 1098, IBEW, 192 N.L.R.B. 837, 841 (1971).
See note 128 supra.
189. See note 128 supra.
190. See note 62 supra.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1978/iss4/12
Number 4] ALTERNATIVES TO THE GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE
result in the disruption of the very industrial order judicial deference
has sought to protect.
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